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ABSTRACT

This report, concerning compliance, with the 1967 and 1971 court decisions on equal educational opportunity in the District of Columbia, summarizes the results of the first part of a two-part study, which examines the District of Columbia's Public School systems experiences resulting from the decrees on equalization expenditures in the elementary school. Citing the examination of the court's influence on educational policy as a major objective, the report examines topics such as court orders, the district's response, what happened in the schools, and alternatives to the decree, including the establishment of a centralized information system, a single equalization office, and suggested procedures for their accomplishment. Although court intervention is said to have ended the "tracking system", along with a reduction in overcrowding in one area of the city, integration of faculty, and improvements in both the data base and the allocation of resources, the educational achievement of children in the D.C. public schools is said to not have improved demonstrably since the initiation of the Julius Hobson suit against the system. A critique of Joan C. Baratz's original evaluation report, said to highlight particular problems with this evaluation and to offer information to clarify some of the misleading interpretations made, is attched as part of this report. (Author/AM)

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EQUALIZATION

-- A Report on Compliance
With Two Court Decisions
In The District of Columbia

D.C. Citizens For Better Public Education, Inc.
June, 1975

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Final Report
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I

INTRODUCTION

In two historic decisions -- one handed down in 1967 and the other in 1971 -- Judge Skelly Wright defined equal educational opportunity beyond desegregation. In 1971 he ruled that the District of Columbia school system must equalize the amounts of money it spent on its pupils in elementary schools and he specified the ways in which this "equalization" was to be accomplished.

But his 1971 ruling left the door open to alternatives. The Court, he said, was willing to modify the "equal dollars per pupil criteria", and the only stipulation was that such plans be "specific, measurable and educationally justifiable, and reasonably designed in substantial part to overcome the effect of past discrimination on the basis of socio-economic and racial status."[1]

Before proposing alternatives, it is necessary to find out exactly what happened under the original Court order. What difference had the two Wright decrees, and especially the specific 1971 Court order, made? What had they meant to the schools -- and to the students? What kinds of resources were shifted? What effect did those shifts have on education programs? Were there any changes in achievement scores as measured by standardized tests?

In 1973, D.C. Citizens for Better Public Education, with the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Syracuse University Research Corporation/Policy Institute, received a grant from the National Institute of Education to try to answer just such questions. These organizations undertook a year-long study to examine the effect of the Wright decrees. The report which follows results from this in depth study.[2]

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1. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 864 (1971).
2. Baratz, Joan C., A Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity in a Major Urban School District: The Case of Washington, D.C., Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1975.

II

THE COURTS RULE

Equal educational opportunity for all children is a central theme in American education. The Supreme Court took a major step toward this goal when, in 1954, it outlawed segregated schools in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision.

As Washington and other school systems around the country desegregated in response to the decision, policy makers and others saw how unequal and inadequate the education offered black children had been. Gradually, Americans realized that the gap in achievement caused by 100 years of discrimination could not be closed simply by desegregation. What other factors were involved? A look at school expenditures in almost any jurisdiction showed large differences in what was spent on some as compared to others.

In the states, the differences often related to taxing capability - an affluent district could raise and spend more money on its children's education than a poor one - and several suits have been brought challenging these district differences in school expenditures. (Rodriquez v. San Antonio Board of Education, Serrano v. Priest, Meskill v. Board of Education and Robinson v. Cahill.) In the city of Washington the neighborhood seemed to make the difference. The per pupil expenditure in schools in largely white, middle class areas was greater than in predominantly black, lower income neighborhoods.

Washington became the first place where a Court suit challenged expenditures among schools within a single district, since the days of the pre-Brown "separate but equal" doctrine.

The Wright Decree

The District of Columbia School System had been an active participant in the judicial search for equal educational opportunity. A District case, Bolling v. Sharpe, outlawed racially segregated education in a decision announced with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. In 1965, Julius Hobson, a local civil rights activist and parent of two children in the D.C. schools, sued the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools, claiming they discriminated against poor and black children and denied them equal opportunity. He cited as evidence the predominance of lower class black children in the "basic track," the segregation of facilities, and the disparities in per pupil expenditures across the city.

In response the Board of Education contended that its policies had not deliberately violated the rights of poor and black children. The problems before the Court, it alleged, stemmed more from the District's segregated social system with its history of discriminatory housing patterns, than Board actions.

The 1967 Decision

Rejecting that argument, Federal Judge Skelly Wright added a new theme to the equalization struggle: "The arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme." He ruled against the defendants. Although the Court found that the discrimination in the disbursement of regular budget funds was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, Judge Wright did not move directly in this first decision to correct these inequalities. He assumed that remedies in the decision -- faculty integration, busing, new boundaries, the end of optional attendance zones -- would reduce them.

To comply with the Court directives, the school administration:

. Discontinued tracking by achievement level and proposed "individualized instruction" to meet the needs of children formerly in "basic" and now in regular classes.

. Developed a busing plan to relieve overcrowding in the schools in southeast Washington.

. Devised a teacher integration plan.

. Created new school boundaries to achieve maximum school integration, abolishing the "optional zones" and "optional features" which had allowed some students to avoid attending predominantly black schools.

1971 Decision

In 1968 Congress passed a law providing for an elected School Board, and Hobson was among the new Board members elected. Using his position, he obtained numerous reports detailing the equipment, the textbooks, the curriculum and the special projects in each school. These reports showed continuing inequities in per pupil expenditures in the schools. Unable to get a plan from the administration to deal with the problems, Julius Hobson returned to court in 1969. He filed a motion asking that all regular budget expenditures for the elementary schools be equalized to within 5 percent of the mean expenditures for all the elementary schools (excluding special education programs for handicapped children).

The dialogue that followed signaled some changes in the civil rights struggle. Hobson made it clear that this motion did not merely request enforcement of the 1967 decree. It was a new thrust -- away from the issue of desegregation and toward that of resource equalization. "Hobson v. Hansen is... on the leading ldge of a transition," he explained, "a subtle but major tactical shift

among blacks nationwide in their fight for a fair share. Its own history reflects this transition."[1]

The defendants countered by asking the Court to vacate the 1967 decree, and release them from the obligations it imposed. They testified that the new Hobson proposal would do nothing to improve the situation, and might make it worse.

Judge Wright ruled that the best data available to him indicated that there was still a substantial difference in per pupil expenditures, favoring the elementary schools in the white affluent area. He ruled that a prima facie case of discrimination had been made. The Judge issued a "show cause" order asking "why the School Board should not devise a plan to equalize within plus or minus 5 percent variation, expenditures for teaching cost... among all the District of Columbia elementary schools."[2]

Denying there was a prima facie case to be made for discrimination, the defense made several claims:

- Per pupil expenditure is a poor measure of equal educational opportunity.
- There was no pattern of expenditure across the city, and those schools with high expenditures had many black students due to busing.
- With equalization, many blacks in higher spending areas would suffer.
- There was not necessarily a relationship between quality teaching and salary.
- The District did not assign teachers according to student income level.
- Inequalities could be accounted for by economies of scale (the larger schools being able to spend more efficiently) and an equalization order would eventually hinder experimentation and innovation.

1. Washington Post, February 21, 1971.
2. Hobson v. Hansen, September 1, 1970 memorandum and opinion of the court.

On May 25, 1971, Judge Wright ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Central to his ruling was the point that the equalization of expenditures applied only to teachers' salaries (including longevity and benefit payments), not to all expenditures. In addition, individual schools could deviate more than 5 percent from the mean for compensatory education, special education services, and expenditures that could be accounted for solely on the basis of economies of scale. (See Appendix I.)

III

THE DISTRICT RESPONDS

Ninety Days to Equalize

Dire predictions followed the 1971 decision: chaos would result; teachers would resign or retire early.

However, the schools opened in the fall of 1971 with little delay and confusion. While the school system does not have figures on the amount of "early" teacher retirement and resignation -- a result of the poor data and information system which many hoped would be remedied by the Court order -- interviews with teachers, principals and administrators indicate that the number was not large.

In July the Board and the Superintendent had hired consultants to help them with an equalization plan. In advising the Board, the consultants faced major problems redistributing teachers to equalize salaries before school began.

First, and most troublesome, they lacked precise information about enrollment at each school and about teacher characteristics (their experience, degrees, subjects or grade) and their actual assignment to the individual schools -- again the result of the poor information system which continues to plague the school system and the larger community. The District had not traditionally used individual schools as the units for planning or accounting purposes. The consultants' first task, then, was to construct an information system about the schools and the teachers who served them.

The second problem was to determine the criteria to be used for shifting teachers to assure compliance with the Wright decree. The Board and the various interest groups concerned, like the Washington Teachers Union or the Council of

School Officers, were reluctant to propose criteria for teacher transfers. Understandably, nobody wanted to be accused of favoritism, nobody wanted to assume responsibility for moving individual teachers from school to school. The job fell, therefore, to the anonymous computer. The consultants presented the Board with several alternative "computer simulations" of teacher transfers based on several factors: moving teachers with more experience or those with less; amount of travel required for transferred teachers; race, sex and experience mix in each school's faculty; teachers' tenure in present buildings. The objective was to prepare a plan which would comply with the Court order with the least disruption to the schools, which was generally translated to mean the plan which moved the fewest number of teachers.

Moving Teachers: The Beginning

The Board ruled out transferring students or closing small schools, and chose not to exempt any schools because of compensatory programs. In August, 1971, the consultants presented to the Board three plans, each of which called for the transfer of about 400 classroom teachers. All three plans, to the extent possible, froze teachers with the longest tenure in the building. The Board chose the one which transferred more experienced teachers first, minimized travel time, excluded no teachers from reassignment (other than Reading and Math Team Leaders who had recently received special training), and attempted to maintain an experience mix but ignore race and sex.[1]

The consultants found that the distribution of special subject teachers, prior to the Court order, had been quite inequitable. On their recommendation, before classroom teachers were reassigned, reading and math teachers were distributed on the basis of need. Other special subject teachers (art, music, foreign language, language arts, science and physical education) were then assigned on a per pupil basis. Whereas many of them had previously been assigned on a full-time basis to

1. Majority of the teachers in elementary schools were black and women.

one school, they were now assigned on an itinerant basis -- e.g., one (20%), two (40%), or three (60%) days to more than one school. With these teachers "frozen in", the classroom teachers were then distributed so that in each elementary school the total teacher dollars was within plus or minus 5 percent of the projected District mean for per pupil expenditures for teachers' salaries.

The mean, calculated by computer, was based on projected school-by-school enrollment figures for the 1971-1972 school year -- figures new to a system which had not projected individual school enrollments before. That these projections were not accurate became clear the following February, when the school administration presented the actual pupil count and the actual teacher placement data on a school-by-school basis.

At that time the data indicated that the plus or minus 5 percent equalization for all the schools had not been achieved. Julius Hobson threatened to return to Court, charging that the school system had failed to comply with the equalization order. Not wishing to interrupt classes already well into the spring semester, the school administration tried to get Hobson to agree to delay further transfers until the following school year.

Hobson was persistent. In the spring of 1972, with seven weeks remaining in the school year, and Hobson threatening contempt of court charges, Superintendent Hugh Scott recommended to the Board that equalization could be achieved with the least disruption by moving special subject teachers, thus changing the percent of their salary charged to each school.

Moving Special Teachers: The Hallmark

The Board approved the plan and some 100 special subject teachers' assignments were changed. Only 11 classroom teachers were moved.

This approach became the hallmark of equalization plans over the next two years. When the figures were collected in the fall of the 1972-1973 school year, and schools needed to gain or lose dollars to comply with the court order, it was the special subject staff that was shifted. No attempt was made to equalize by substituting a less expensive teacher for a more expensive one, or vice versa, even though that is what was done with classroom teachers in the initial moves in September, 1971.

This had some ironic results. In effect, it nullified the one policy in the original equalization plan related to educational need: the placement of special reading and math teachers in schools where the need for them was greatest. And it affected various educational programs haphazardly: art programs suddenly disappeared when the art teachers were shifted, or schools were equalized by assigning them three music teachers or two Latin teachers.[1]

Trying to correct such disorders, the school system moved toward a school-by-school budgeting procedure. Schools were asked to indicate in order of priority what special subject teachers they might wish to lose or gain should dollar needs warrant any movement of teachers. This in turn encouraged decentralization and individual school planning, as well as "consumer" involvement in decision-making.

By the 1973-1974 school year, equalization throughout the city had become more a mechanical than policy process: dollar needs were computed and special subject teachers moved to achieve compliance. By the next school year -- 1974-1975 -- the problems inherent in such an approach became obvious. Some schools simply ran out of special subject teachers. Other had not only lost special subject teachers over the years, but were due to lose additional resources because of declining enrollments. Special subject teachers protested that they could not develop meaningful programs.

1. Washington Post, November 27, 1974.

In December, 1974, the Superintendent submitted the annual compliance report to the Board for approval before sending it to the Court. It called for the transfer of classroom teachers as well as special subject teachers; over half (79) of the 163 elementary schools were to be affected.

Many objected to the plan and community spokesmen challenged the accuracy of the data used to compute the equalization plan. A revised plan was prepared, but still, in January 1975, some 20 classroom and over 80 special subject teachers were transferred. Even as she submitted the report, the Superintendent expressed dissatisfaction with it and indicated that the school system was working on an alternative that would allocate resources according to individual needs.

IV

WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SCHOOLS?

Because of the increasing dissatisfaction with the annual equalization process, D.C. Citizens for Better Public Education initiated a study undertaken by Syracuse University Research Corporation (SURC) to determine the effect of the 1971 Wright decision on the school system.

Thirty-eight schools were selected in the SURC study -- those which spent the least number of regular budget dollars for teachers, and those which spent the most in the school year before the equalization decree. The staff compared the distribution of dollars and teachers with what existed three years later in January, 1974. (See Appenxix II for detailed data.) In addition, teachers, principals, and others associated with the school system in Washington, D.C., during the equalization years, were interviewed.

The 38 Schools: 1970-71

The two groups had some pronounced characteristics. The low spending schools tended to be large, while the high spending schools tended to be small. In fact, the low spending schools served about 19 percent of all the elementary school children in the District, while the most favored schools served only 6 percent.

The socio-economic status of the children in the two groups of schools differed greatly too. The low spending schools were located in parts of the city where the family income averaged $8,411. In contrast, the high spending schools fell into two groups: (1) schools in affluent areas where family income averaged $19,931; and (2) schools where family incomes averaged $8,881. (See Appendix II, Tables 1 and 2.)

In 1971 the high spending schools spent an average of $540 per pupil for classroom teachers (with a range from $455 to $672), the low spending schools only $398 (with a range of $332 to $448). Expenditures for special subject teachers differed no less dramatically. High spending schools spent an average of $147 per pupil, while the low spending schools spent $62. (See Appendix II, Table 3.)

All in all, in 1971, the high spending schools outspent the low spending schools from regular budget funds by 49 percent. The average spent from regular funds for all teachers' salaries included in equalization was $687 per pupil in the high spending schools, and only $460 in the low spending schools.

Pupil/Teacher Ratios

Pupil/teacher ratios for classroom teachers followed the same pattern. High spending schools averaged 22:1, low spending schools 28:1. Although the School Board in February, 1971, passed a resolution recommending that no elementary class include more than 28 students, 12 of the 20 low spending schools had classes at or above this number. No high spending school had classes exceeding the recommended maximum.

Again, the difference for special subject teachers was even greater: high spending schools averaged one teacher for every 80 students, while the low spending schools averaged one for every 182 children.

Allocation of Professional Staff Not Included in Equalization

Although Judge Wright's Court order did not include other professional school staff -- librarians, counselors, special education, and speech teachers -- this study examined their distribution as well. In 1970-1971, high spending schools received more of these services.

The 38 Schools: 1974

How have three years of equalization affected the allocation of teachers in high and low spending schools? Has the shifting of teachers affected the distribution of other services? Has the attention paid dollar expenditures helped correct inequalities in pupil/teacher ratios?

The Difference Diminishes

The amount of money the high spending schools spent on classroom teachers before and after equalization appears unchanged -- $540 per pupil in 1971 and $534 per pupil in 1974. However, there was a drop in the number of teachers in these schools in 1974. Increases in teachers' salaries and decreases in enrollment during the period from 1971-1974 resulted in equalization dollars per pupil buying fewer teachers. But in the low spending schools the story was different: their average expenditure rose from $398 to $508. (See Appendix II, Table 4)

In 1971 special subject teacher expenditures had heavily favored the high spending schools, with an average of $147 per pupil compared to $62 per pupil in low spending schools. In 1974 the per pupil expenditures in high spending schools for special subjects had dropped to $105, and the low spending schools went up to $110. All the low spending schools had special subject teachers in 1974, while 5 percent of the high spending schools had none.

A look at the regular budget funds spent on both classroom and special subject teachers before and after equalization shows a dramatic drop in the difference between the high and low spending schools. Before equalization, the high spending schools had outspent the low by about 50 percent. Now the difference was only 3 percent.

But Differences Remain

Judge Wright ruled that each elementary school should be within 5 percent of the mean or average for all the District elementary schools. This 10 percent range was designed to give the school administration some flexibility in assigning personnel, and permit individual schools a bit of leeway in absorbing enrollment and staffing changes.

Still, there were wide differences within the post-equalization school system. (See Appendix II, Tables 4 and 5.) If one measures the 38 study schools against the District-wide mean in November, 1973, 21 schools are found to be out of compliance with the Court order. Thirteen formerly low spending schools fall below the required minimum. Eight of the formerly high spending schools were also out of compliance: two were above the limit, and six below.

Why is this so? The school administration's report to the court in December, 1973, had indicated all schools in compliance. The principals' reports of staff actually in the schools on January 3, 1974, showed they were not. An analysis of the differences in the two reports shows a number of factors which throw schools out of compliance:

. Missing Staff. Staff assigned to the schools do not always report to that school or they do not render the amount of services indicated on the compliance report. In other instances the problem was the school system's policy of assigning vacant positions to achieve compliance. The administration equalized by assigning a vacancy to a school, then, after the start of the year, either these vacancies went unfilled, or they were filled but for less money than was originally allocated. Occasionally, and inadvertently, staff positions were filled and listed in the compliance report but paid from funds outside the regular school budget (so they cannot be counted in the compliance process).

Take low-spending Davis school. A science teacher was assigned to Davis for 40 percent of his time. For some reason, that teacher did not report to Davis. A reading teacher, who had been assigned for 60 percent of time and salary (three days), actually taught at Davis only two days a week (40 percent). The school administration also had allocated funds for a reading position and for 20 percent of the services of a language teacher, but those positions were unfilled in January. The special subject supervisors agreed there was little likelihood of finding qualified candidates for them. Furthermore, the third grade teacher vacancy was filled at Davis at an actual cost per annum of $9,982, instead of the estimated $14,123 per annum, the average salary for a District of Columbia teacher. The result was an additional $34,121 teacher dollars, which the school should have received in services. (See Appendix II, Table 6.)

. Equalizing at the Extremes. Regardless of size, schools equalized at the top or bottom of the expenditure range are vulnerable where actual staffing differs from the staffing anticipated at the time of the compliance report, or if enrollment changes. River Terrace, for example, a small school with an enrollment of 313, was equalized toward the top of the range (+4.40 percent). In January a special subject teacher, who had been assigned to the school for three days, was, in fact, at the school full-time, putting the school out of compliance. Emery School, equalized toward the bottom (-4.51 percent), was out of compliance in January when enrollment increased by 26 students. Between October 1973 and January 1974, Stevens School lost eight children, but it would have been out of compliance had it only lost one, since it had been equalized at the top of the range (+5 percent, or $699).

Additional examples of some of the problems are described in Appendix II, Tables 6, 7 and 8.

Pupil/Teacher Ratios

Overall pupil/teacher ratios have improved along with dollar equalization. These ratios, once 28:1 for the low and 22:1 for the high spending schools studied, are now about the same in the two groups: 22:1 for the low, and 21:1 for the high spending schools. Clearly, the low spending schools gained staff.

The pupil/classroom teacher ratio reflects the same changes. The ratio in the low spending schools improved -- from 28:1 in 1971 to 26:1 in 1974 -- and the ratio in the high spending schools rose -- from 22:1 in 1971 to 25:1 in 1974.

The slight increase in the classroom size in the high spending schools probably reflects both the initial school administration policy to try to maintain the pre-equalization number of classroom teachers wherever possible and the decision of principals and community groups to favor low pupil/classroom teacher ratios. As a result, many high spending schools had to sacrifice all, or almost all, of their special subject teachers in order to pay classroom teachers' salaries. They would have lost more classroom teachers had they not suffered a severe 80 percent cut in their special subject staff. (See Appendix II, Table 8.)

Some schools did not choose this course of their own accord. In small schools there is very little option about the number of classroom teachers; particularly in those schools which have combined classes because of low enrollments.

Allocation of Professional Staff Not Included In Equalization

And what of the staff not included in equalization -- the counselors, librarians, special education teachers -- who had been distributed so unevenly before?

In 1974 the high spending schools still heavily outspent the low, a fact which might be discouraging to advocates of court mandated change. (See Appendix II, Table 9.) Where the Court did not order equity, inequity was reduced but still remains. Four years after the decision the high spending schools averaged $71 per child for support staff, the low spending schools $51.

In the high spending schools the staff/student ratio for counselors, librarians and speech teachers in 1974 was 226:1, compared to 312:1 average in the low spending schools. The low spending schools, with approximately three times the enrollment of the high spending schools, have 16 such teachers -- or an average 913:1 instead of a 349:1 pupil/staff ratio. These ratios result from a policy of assigning support positions to a building, and not on a per pupil basis.

Title I and Comparability

The District School System now receives about $10 million a year in Title I (of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965) funds. Since 1971-1972 these monies have been concentrated on reading and math staff in those schools determined by the administration to have the highest concentration of educationally disadvantaged children.

In 1972, one year after the equalization decree, the Office of Education tightened the regulations for Title I spending to ensure that the funds would supplement local school district funds. The regulations stated that the average expenditure per pupil for staff in Title I schools be no less than minus 5 percent of the average expenditure per pupil for staff in all non-Title I schools.

While the intent of this Title I guideline closely resembles that of the Wright decree, the formulas for computing compliance differ. (See Appendix II, Chart A.)

To comply with the Wright decree, the per pupil expenditure for teachers' salaries (classroom and special subject teachers), including longevity payments and fringe benefits, must be equalized in all elementary schools within plus or minus 5 percent of the mean per pupil expenditure for all elementary schools. To comply with Title I regulations, the per pupil expenditures for salaries (base salary only) for all instructional staff (teachers, administrators, librarians, etc.) in the Title I schools only must be at least 95 percent of the mean expenditure for the non-Title I schools. Thus, the Title I regulations do not require that per pupil expenditures in the non-Title I schools be equalized. Further, in computing the mean, longevity payments and benefits are not included.

The Washington, D.C. school administration claims that the differences between the two constraints make it impossible to meet both simultaneously. In complying with the two, it now prepares separate reports. To satisfy the Wright decree, it calculates expenditures per pupil on the basis of actual enrollment in the second week of October, adjusts teacher allocation accordingly, and then submits reports to the School Board and Court showing how instructional expenditures are equalized within the required range. It then calculates how far the comparability requirements are met, and reshuffles staff once more to satisfy them (in 1973-1974 it found some extra funds at the last moment and so was able to add Title I school staff, rather than reshuffle). When moving teachers to comply with Title I, the school system can easily move itself out of compliance with the Wright decree.

Equalization and Academic Performance

Judgments about the effects of equalization on academic performance are difficult to make. In 1973 the school system abandoned system-wide standardized

testing. However, they did continue the standardized testing of a small representative sample of the children (10 percent of grades 1-9). Like other cities unaffected by equalization orders, the results indicate that the reading performance of students in the District has continued to decline. In 1974, except for a small improvement in the first and second grades tested, District pupils over-all scored two years below the national norm and 1.9 years behind the norm for big-city schools.

These results have serious limitations as measures of effects of equalization. Data available in the compliance reports, which rank schools in quintiles according to reading performance, indicate that academic movement among high and low spending schools appears random. In the low spending schools in the study, two moved up a quintile, nine moved down a quintile, and nine were unchanged. In the high spending schools, five moved up at least one quintile, one moved down, and twelve were unchanged. In view of the types of resources shifted and the difficulties in actual compliance, it is not surprising that no effect on performance can be shown.

Equalization: To Sum Up

Despite the obstacles facing it in 1971, the school system has made a sincere effort to comply with the equalization decree. As a result, the distribution of regular budget monies spent for teachers in the District of Columbia has improved greatly since the Wright decree of 1971.

Before equalization there was a 49 percent difference between the per pupil expenditures in the high spending and low spending schools in the D.C. Citizens Committee sample study. After equalization, that difference had dropped to 3 percent. (See Appendix II, Table 9.) While all the schools were not in compliance, there had been a significant reduction in the inequities in expenditures. Initially, high paid classroom teachers had been exchanged for less expensive ones, teachers had

been added in low spending schools with high pupil/teacher ratios and special subject teachers had been redistributed. By 1974 the formerly low spending schools enjoyed more of the special subject teachers' services than did the formerly high spending schools, many of which had suffered severe losses.

The fact that many schools were not in compliance with the Wright decree in 1974 -- or at any given point in time -- seemed a result of administrative difficulties. By and large, the school system lacks reliable school-by-school information. Before equalization the school administration had no school-by-school information system, and many of its supporters hoped that it would use the Wright decree and Title I constraints to demonstrate its need for one. But though there have been some improvements, it is still a cumbersome task to provide the Court, or the federal Office of Education with accurate school-by-school data.

Teachers, principals, administrators, Board members and community leaders -- including Hobson -- all feel that while equalization has resulted in a fairer system, it has not had a significant educational effect. Equalization has secured an approximately equal allocation of teacher dollars from the regular budget to each elementary school. This is in itself a major achievement: there are few school districts in the United States which can claim such equality.

V

IS THERE ANOTHER WAY?

As the District school system has struggled with problems that at times seem to overwhelm it, as it has tried each year to satisfy both the Wright decree and Title I "comparability" restraints -- shuffling and reshuffling teachers and placating parents worried about all the disruption -- many have wondered if there is not another way to equal educational opportunity.

D.C. Citizens' study suggests that any move toward modifying or finding alternatives to the Wright decree in the District of Columbia should consider the following.

An Expanded Information System

Right now the many parts of the school system dealing with Title I and Wright decree compliance -- the payroll office, the Title I office, the Equalization office -- all keep separate files, and the links between them are tenuous. To comply with both the Court order and the Title I guidelines, the District must have accurate, up to date information in one place. This information should be cumulative as well as current, and should include statistics on a school-by-school basis. Setting up such an information system is well within the means of current computer technology. A centralized information system need not mean centralized decision making; on the contrary, a well designed information system could give local school authorities not only accurate information about their individual schools, but also facts on the variety of options available to them.

A centralized information system should be established in the District of Columbia school system. The present system of information gathering, storage

and retrieval must be modernized. Data from the personnel office, the Title I office, the Payroll office, the research planning and development office, the equalization office and the budget office must all be merged into a central file; programs must be designed to indicate "at the flick of a switch," compliance status with the Wright decree or Title I guidelines.

A Single Compliance Office

Now, two separate offices prepare compliance reports for the Court and for the Office of Education. Neither office takes an active role in the work of the other. For example, in January 1975, school administration officials moved teachers to equalize under the Court order, and moved other teachers in February to satisfy Title I without first finding out whether these transfers put the schools out of compliance with the Court order.

Furthermore, during the past four years of equalization, the school administration has equalized the schools on the basis of actual enrollment of students as of one day in October. The compliance office has routinely received notice of personnel changes during the year, but the effect of these changes on equalization in the schools has not been considered at the time the changes are made. The result has been that in the following October, the individual school may again be out of compliance and teachers moved. Some of this disruption might be reduced if the per pupil expenditure in all of the elementary schools is monitored constantly and all movements out of compliance noted as they occur and taken into consideration when further personnel changes are made.

A single equalization office should be set up for the District School System responsible for both compliance reporting and monitoring.

Suggested Procedure

. Establish a central information file which contains all data on a school-by-school basis for which Judge Wright requested expenditure reports: all regular budget funds, Impact Aid, Title I, and other Federal funds.

. Assure maximum verification of school-by-school data, as well as opportunities for school comparisons by:

-- Publishing a resource allocations directory at least twice a year, listing the specific resources allocated to the schools from all sources as required for Wright decree compliance -- a directory detailed enough to allow for school-by-school verification by narrow, not general (i.e., "instructional staff"), categories.

-- Setting up a committee at each school similar to those formed to recommend equalization priorities, to review school reports and verify the actual arrival of teachers at school sites.

. Identify those schools with significant fluctuations in enrollment during the course of the year and equalize these schools within a narrower range than plus or minus 5 percent.

. Allot vacancy dollar values comparable to the cost of a substitute teacher or the average salary of teachers who fill vacant positions, rather than comparable to the average salary of all District teachers.

. Keep the equalization report current by running reports promptly when shifts due to retirement, transfers, or new hiring occur.

. Assure that no schools are equalized at the extremes.

Return to the Court

It is hard to find anyone entirely satisfied with the equalization process now in effect in the District of Columbia. Though equalization has achieved a great deal, it is criticized for three main reasons: the shifting of teachers during the course of the year; the lack of special subject teachers in some schools; and the lack of attention being paid to youngsters with special needs.

Is it possible to devise another plan that would both satisfy the Court's desire to provide "equal educational opportunity" to all District school children and satisfy the community's desire for "effective schools"? Is there a better way?

Can We Take Account of Individual Differences?

Washington's equalization plan now treats all children as if they were exactly alike and makes no allowances for individual needs.

The school administration has indicated interest in a plan based on the educational theory of "incommensurability" -- a theory which holds that all children vary in ability and learning pace over time and therefore education must be individualized.[1] Any such plan must meet the Court's criteria of being "specific measurable and educationally justifiable" and "reasonably designed in substantive part to overcome the effect of past discrimination on the basis of socio-economic and racial status...".

Many states have tried to individualize education through disbursement formulas which attempt to allocate more dollars to those students with more needs. Generally, these formulas weight factors such as the costs of educating children of different ages or different types (preschool, bilingual, poor, rural, handicapped) or in different courses of study (academic, technical, vocational).

1. David Hawkins, Human Nature and the Scope of Education. Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education, 1972.

Can We Emphasize Service, Not Dollars?

A plan might address itself to the services actually offered school children, rather than the dollars available to their schools.

The voucher system is an example which gives parents the option of "purchasing" educational programs, as in the Alum Rock (California) experiment. The District of Columbia's "six school project" is an attempt to provide all children in an area equal access to all programs.

Can We Emphasize Educational Stability?

Frequent shifting of teachers has been the cause of much of the dissatisfaction with the decree. An improved information system which provides constantly up-dated information might help by alerting schools to possible allocation problems as enrollments change.

VI

SUMMARY

This brief report summarizes the result of the first part of a two-part study, designed to examine what has happened in the District of Columbia as a result of the Wright decree on equalization expenditures. The second part of the study, now in progress, will use the findings of this report as a basis for proposing possible alternative plans for resource allocation which the District of Columbia might adopt to assure to all students equal opportunity for a quality education.

One of the objectives of this study has been to examine the influence of the Court on educational policy. It is clear that the Courts have played a central role in the District of Columbia's quest for equal educational opportunity for all its pupils. From Plessy v. Ferguson to Hobson v. Hansen, the courtroom has been the setting for redefining "equal educational opportunity" during the school system's history -- from "separate but equal" to "desegregation" to "integration," to "equal dollars." The underlying motivation for these Court orders was the assumption that changes in input would cause changes in educational output as measured by academic achievement and school retention rates.

Educational achievement of children in the District of Columbia public schools has not improved demonstrably since the initiation of Hobson's suit against the system. Court intervention did produce other results.

. The end of the "tracking" system.

. The reduction of overcrowding in one area of the city.

. The integration of faculty.

. An improvement in the allocation of resources in the elementary schools.

. Some improvement in the data base and an increased demand for further improvement.

Much still needs to be done to achieve compliance with the 1971 decree and with Title I requirements. While instituting improved procedures might well result in the actual dollar equalization of schools for both formulas (or will at least highlight the difficulties inherent in complying with both), it is doubtful that moving present resources from place to place will in itself effect changes in educational outcomes.

APPENDIX I

INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN COMPLIANCE REPORT TO THE COURT

UNDER 1971 HOBSON DECREE

I. A. By October 1, 1971, per pupil expenditures for all teachers salaries and benefits from the regular D. C. budget in any elementary school shall not deviate more than plus and minus five percent from the mean of all elementary schools.

B. Schools may deviate more than five percent only with adequate justification presented to the court. Such justifications shall include:

1. Provision for compensatory education for educationally deprived children.

2. Special education services for the physically or mentally handicapped or other "exceptional" children.

3. Deviation that is accounted for solely on the basis of economies and diseconomies of scale.

C. Computation of expenditures per school will be based on classroom teachers and special subject teachers and total average daily membership.

II. A. The school shall present to the court and the plaintiffs in October and June of every year a report indicating the adminfstration's compliance with the court order. The report shall include at least the following information for every school:

a. name,
b. census data on neighborhood,
c. average daily membership,
d. number and percentage of children by race,
e. percent of capacity of building being utilized,
f. total number of teachers,
g. pupil/teacher ratio,
h. total operating expenditures from the regular budget,
i. per pupil expenditures from the regular budget.

j. total expenditures for all teachers' salaries and benefits from regular budget,
k. per pupil expenditures for teachers' salaries and benefits from regular budget,
l. total expenditures from impact aid,
m. total expenditures from Title I,
n. per pupil expenditures from Title I
o. total expenditures from UPO,
p. per pupil expenditure from UPO,
q. total expenditures from all sources, and
r. per pupil expenditure from all sources.

B. The report will include the mean for all schools for teachers salaries and benefits from regular budget funds and the five percent upper and lower dollar bounds from that mean.

C. Any changes in computing data from year to year will be prominently disclosed.

III. And finally, "At some future time, the Board and the school administration may adopt specific measurable and educationally justifiable plans which are consistent with the present order. At such time, upon a prima facie showing that the plans are reasonably designed in substantial part to overcome the effect of past discrimination on the basis of socio-economic and racial status, the court may modify the present order." [17]

APPENDIX II

The Data

Judge Wright's 1971 decree focused on classroom and special subject teachers paid from regular budget funds. The regular budget constitutes approximately 75-80 percent of the total school budget. The other 20-25 percent of the school budget is derived from Impact Aid funds (2-5 percent) and categorical Federal grants -- monies targeted for particular groups to meet specific needs (e.g., ESEA Title I, NDEA, Agriculture Lunch Aid grants).

Data on expenditures for this study were collected from the following sources: the November 1973 compliance report submitted to the courts by the school system; the individual school membership lists submitted by school principals for March 1971 and January 1974; the payrolls for March 1971 and October 1973, and the March 1974 comparability report submitted to the USOE.

The study used the terminology for professional staff used by the District of Columbia:

(1) Administrative -- principals, assistant principals, community coordinators.

(2) Classroom teachers -- kindergarten through grade six.

(3) Special subject teachers -- art, foreign languages, language arts, science, music, physical education, reading and mathematics, including reading and mathematics resource coordinators.

(4) Support staff - librarians, counselors, social workers, sight and hearing therapists, psychologists, speech teachers. (Social workers, psychologists and sight and hearing therapists constituted such a small percentage of the support staff assigned to schools that for the purposes of this study they were omitted from our data tabulations.)

(5) Special Education staff.

One of the major limitations of the data is that they were collected at individual points in time and to not represent a picture of the actual resources that went into a school over the course of a year. Thus, a vacancy that shows up in our March 1971 or January 1974 data may be filled at another time, or a filled position may become vacant. The school system reports "projected expenditures" to the Court. It does not collect actual expenditures on a school-by-school basis.

The 67 elementary schools (57 percent of the total) that, based on reports to the Court or the 1971 summer data, appeared to be at the extremes of the District's spending scale for 1970-1971, were ranked according to their per pupil expenditures for the salaries of all teachers included in equalization. The 20 highest and the 20 lowest spending of these schools were selected for our case study. After collecting all the data for the 40 schools, a number of problems involving the accuracy of the data in two high spending schools became apparent. These schools were eliminated and that group was reduced to 18 schools.

APPENDIX II

CHART A

COMPARISON OF 1971 HOBSON DECREE COMPLIANCE AND TITLE I GUIDELINES COMPARABILITY FORMULATIONS

	1971 Hobson Decree	Title I Comparability
What Fund Source?	Regular	Regular budget Impact Aid
What Staff?	Classroom teachers Special subject teachers	Classroom teachers Special subject teachers Librarians Psychologists Social Workers Guidance Counselors Educational Aides Speech Teachers Principals Assistant Principals Community Coordinators
What Pay?	Base salary Longevity payments benefits	Base salary
What Mean?	District-wide	Non-Title I Schools
What Criteria for Compliance?	±5% mean per pupil salary expenditure (including longevity)	Title I schools must be --at least 95% of mean per pupil salary expenditure (excluding longevity) --at least 95% of mean pupil/staff ratio --95% of mean of instructional materials costs (if necessary)

APPENDIX II

CHART B

PROFESSIONAL STAFF BASED IN SCHOOLS

Included in our Data		Not included in our Data*
Covered by Wright Decree	Not Covered by Decree	Not Covered by Decree
Classroom Teachers** - K-6	Support Staff - Librarians - Counselors - Speech Teachers	Support Staff - Psychologists - Social Workers - Sight and Hearing Therapists
Special Subject Teachers - Art - Foreign Language - Language Arts - Music - Physical Education - Science - Reading - Math	Special Education - MIND - School-Based - Extended Learning - Crisis-Resource - Social Adjustment	Special Education (discrete classes) - Mentally Retarded - Learning Disabled Administrative - Principals - Assistant Principals - Community Coordinators

* Except those supported by Federal funds.

** In 1974-75 the District included preschool teachers and teacher aides in their compliance report. They were not included in our 1973-1974 data.

APPENDIX II

Table 1

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS

1971

School	Enrollment[1]	Reading Group[2]	Median Family Income[3]	% Black[4]
ANACOSTIA Regular				
Davis	1062	3	10861	100.0
Kenilworth	792	5	6875	99.7
Ketcham	954	4	9148	97.5
Kimball	998	2	7564	98.3
Nalle	941	2	8675	100.0
Orr	385	3	9450	93.7
Simon	1079	3	8686	98.9
Smothers	596	1	8186	99.9
TOTAL	6807	23	69445	
MEAN	851	2.9	8681	98.5
ANACOSTIA Project				
Congress Hgts.	973	2	8102	94.7
Draper	1027	3	7010	99.4
McGogney	851	4	8037	99.4
Savoy	1043	3	8022	99.8
TOTAL	3894	12	31171	
MEAN	974	3	7793	98.3
CENTER CITY Model				
Bowen	819	3	8077	84.6
Tubman	893	5	6072	97.8
TOTAL	1712	8	14149	
MEAN	856	4	7075	91.2

[1] March 1971 membership.

[2] Lewin Quintile Ratings; 1 is highest, 5 lowest.

[3] 1970 census data.

[4] October 22, 1970 membership. (March percentages were not available.)

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 1

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS
(continued)

School	Enrollment[1]	Reading Group[2]	Median Family Income[3]	% Black[4]
CENTER CITY Regular				
Emery	926	3	8466	96.6
Lenox	296	4	9029	98.4
Noyes	650	2	9850	100.0
Rudolph	448	2	10067	99.4
Slowe	802	3	10301	98.6
Walker Jones	619	3	5734	97.8
TOTAL	4261	17	53447	
MEAN	710	2.8	8908	98.5
20 SCHOOLS TOTAL	16674	60	168212	1954.5
20 SCHOOLS MEAN	834	3	8411	97.7
MEAN ALL D.C. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS	650	2.5	9583	92.6

1/ March 1971 membership.

2/ Lewin Quintile Ratings; 1 is highest, 5 lowest

3/ 1970 census data.

4/ October 22, 1970 membership. (March percentages were not available.)

APPENDIX II

Table 2

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS
1971

School	Enrollment[1]	Reading Group[2]	Median Family Income[3]	% Black[4]
ANACOSTIA Regular				
Nichols Ave.	244	1	8022	100.0
River Terrace	408	2	10772	99.4
TOTAL	652	3	18794	
MEAN	326	1.5	9397	99.7
CENTER CITY Model				
Cleveland	251	4	6174	100.0
Garrison	766	5	6563	98.2
Grimke	365	5	5497	100.0
Harrison	367	5	6521	99.2
TOTAL	1749	19	24755	
MEAN	437	4.8	6189	99.4
CENTER CITY Regular				
Bowen	481	5	12908	99.0
Edmonds	165	2	10911	96.7
Giddings	359	5	6844	100.0
Petworth	469	2	10343	100.0
Stevens	216	2	13139	74.5
TOTAL	1690	16	54145	
MEAN	338	3.2	10829	94.0

[1] March 1971 membership.

[2] Lewin Quintile Ratings; 1 is highest, 5 lowest

[3] 1970 census data.

[4] October 22, 1970 membership. (March percentages were not available.)

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 2

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS
(Continued)

School	Enrollment[1]	Reading Group[2]	Median Family Income[3]	% Black[4]
WEST OF THE PARK Regular				
Fillmore	125	1	17352	54.1
Hardy	157	1	22207	52.7
Hyde	108	2	21455	59.8
Janney	371	1	17443	25.1
Key	155	1	26539	30.0
Murch	571	1	17469	10.8
Stoddert	149	1	17049	6.3
TOTAL	[illegible]36	8	139514	
MEAN	234	1.1	19931	34.1
18 SCHOOLS TOTAL	5727	46	237208	1305.8
18 SCHOOLS MEAN	318	2.6	13178	72.5
MEAN ALL D.C. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS	650	2.5	9583	92.6

1/ March 1971 membership.

2/ Lewin Quintile Ratings; 1 is highest, 5 lowest.

3/ 1970 census data.

4/ October 22, 1970 membership. (March percentages were not available.)

APPENDIX II

TABLE 3

PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES

1971

	Equalization Staff						
	Classroom Teachers	Special Subject Teachers	Total	Support Staff	Special Education Staff	Federally Funded Staff	Total
Low (16674)	$398	$62	$460	$35	$ 7	$14	$516
High (5727)	$540	$147	$687	$67	$ 21	$21	$796
Percent Difference			49%	91%	200%	50%	54%

Source: Compiled from March 1971 official school membership lists and official March 1971 payroll.

EQUALIZATION PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
(1974)

LOW SPENDING				HIGH SPENDING			
School	Classroom	Special Subject	Total	School	Classroom	Special Subject	Total
Bancroft	$501	$133	$634	Bowen	$496	$181	$677
Congress Heights	511	146	657	Cleveland	557	73	630**
Davis	541	75	616**	Edmonds	423	219	642
Draper	458	119	577**	Fillmore*	680	---	680
Emery	511	97	608**	Garrison	492	170	662
Kenilworth	547	76	623**	Giddings	518	175	693
Ketcham	496	102	598**	Grimke	552	86	638
Kimball	491	102	593**	Hardy*	626	36	662
Lenox	618	51	669	Harrison	497	61	558**
McCogney	534	116	650	Hyde*	598	---	598**
Nalle	540	140	680	Janney*	522	153	675
Noyes	515	89	604**	Key*	635	---	635
Orr	447	134	581**	Murch*	602	54	656
Rudolph	524	106	630**	Nichols Ave.	406	113	519**
Savoy	474	114	588**	Petworth	483	96	579**
Simon	493	117	610**	River Terrace	612	100	712**
Slowe	585	76	661	Stevens	745	---	745**
Smothers	531	119	650	Stoddert*	$590	---	$590**
Tubman	470	124	594**				
Walker Jones	469	125	594**				
WEIGHTED MEAN	$508	$110	$619	WEIGHTED MEAN	$534	$105	$639

*West of the Park

**Deviates from November 1973 compliance report city wide mean $665.45 (±5% or range $633.13 to $699.77). Schools are therefore not in compliance with the Wright decree.

Source: Compiled from January 1974 official school membership, October 1973, and January 1974 payrolls. Data include calculations for benefits.

APPENDIX II

Table 5

AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE IN DOLLAR EXPENDITURES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS:

HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS

	January 1974 Membership (M)			November 1973 Compliance Report (C)			Comparisons		
School	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Equal ±5%	Staff-Dollar Agreement	Total Dollar Difference (C-M)
Bowen	445	$301,446	$677	456	$310,306	$681	2.37%	$284,829	$ - 8,860
Cleveland	252	158,867	630**	248	162,614	655	-1.46	156,965	- 3,747
Edmonds	98	62,926	642	98	67,911	693	4.14	[illegible]792	- 4,985
Fillmore *	116	78,889	680	113	78,889	698	4.91	78,889	0
Garrison	722	477,493	662	720	478,686	664	-.09	447,664	-31,193
Giddings	267	185,070	693	266	185,070	697	4.75	185,070	0
Grinke	268	170,920	638	280	184,959	661	.73	156,279	- 14,039
Hardy*	104	68,839	662	108	68,839	637	-4.21	68,839	0
Harrison	378	211,579	558**	372	239,825	645	-3.12	211,579	- 28,246
Hyde*	118	70,613	598	120	80,625	672	.91	61,102	- 10,012

*West of Park School

**Out of compliance with November 1973 Report Mean

Source compiled from November 1973 Compliance Report, January 1974 official school membership lists and January 1974 payroll calculations and benefits included.

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 5

AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE IN DOLLAR EXPENDITURES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS:

HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS
(Continued)

School	January 1974 Membership (M)			November 1973 Compliance Report (C)			Comparisons		
	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Equal ±5%	Staff Dollar Agreement	Total Dollar Difference (C-M)
Janney	282	$190,471	$675	279	$194,189	$697	4.78%	$180,211	$ - 3,718
Key*	85	53,961	635	85	57,745	679	2.09	53,961	- 3,784
Murch*	496	325,590	656	469	326,080	695	4.48	303,188	- 490
Nichols	333	172,735	519**	341	221,407	649	-2.43	164,826	-48,673
Petworth	449	260,163	579**	428	273,337	639	-4.03	240,118	-13,174
River Tr.	313	222,396	712**	314	218,151	695	4.40	211,035	+ 4,744
Stevens	120	89,439	745**	128	89,439	698	5.00	89,439	0
Stoddert	104	61,389	590**	112	70,817	635	-4.56	61,389	- 9,428

*West of Park School

**Out of compliance with November 1973 Report Mean

Source: Compiled from November 1973 Compliance Report, January 1974 official school membership lists and January 1974 payroll calculations, and benefits included.

Table 5

AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE IN DOLLAR EXPENDITURES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS:

LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS

School	January 1974 Membership (M) Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	November 1973 Compliance Report (C) Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Comparisons Equal ±5%	Staff Dollar Difference	Total Dollar Difference (C-M)
Bancroft	706	$447,556	$634	726	$473,768	$653	-1.87%	$423,357	$-26,214
Congress Hts.	775	508,984	657	780	506,282	649	-2.46	485,473	+ 2,702
Davis	947	583,438	616**	976	617,559	633	-4.87	566,754	-34,121
Draper	921	530,873	577**	915	579,853	634	-4.72	4[illegible]4,727	-48,980
Emery	835	507,623	608**	809	514,055	635	-4.51	452,885	-5,432
Kenilworth	587	365,936	623**	585	404,423	692	3.9[illegible]	325,525	-38,48[illegible]
Ketcham	877	524,791	598**	875	556,805	636	-4.37	486,865	-32,074
Kimball	854	506,440	593**	868	555,251	640	-3.87	476,869	-48,811
Lenox	190	127,182	669	187	127,334	681	2.23	123,380	- 152
McGogney	906	589,149	650	926	616,550	666	.06	547,670	-27,401
Malle	817	555,161	680	846	557,740	660	-.87	531,439	- 2,580

** Out of compliance with November 1973 Report to compliance district-wide mean.

Source: Compiled from November 1973 Compliance Report, January 1974 official school membership lists and January 1974 payroll calculations and benefits included.

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 5

AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE IN DOLLAR EXPENDITURES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS:

LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS

(Continued)

	January 1974 Membership (M)			November 1973 Compliance Report (C)			Comparisons		
Schools	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Enrollment	Total Dollars	Dollar Per Pupil	Equal ±5%	Staff Dollar Agreement	Total Dollar Difference (C-M)
Noyes	516	$311,848	$604**	507	$324,489	$640	-3.82%	$271,690	$ -12,641
Orr	446	259,150	581**	448	285,371	637	-4.28	252,831	-26,221
Rudolph	820	516,437	630**	816	527,648	647	-2.83	466,357	-11,211
Savoy	833	489,670	588**	785	532,310	678	1.90	426,887	-42,640
Sitton	1,035	631,812	610**	1,005	645,685	642	-3.45	602,606	-13,873
Slowe	616	407,177	661	614	417,906	681	2.36	378,301	-10,730
Smothers	528	342,959	650	527	342,959	651	-2.20	331,944	0
Tubman	820	486,603	594**	820	535,786	653	-1.81	444,976	-49,183
Walker-Jones	581	344,979	594**	591	375,674	636	-4.48	313,029	-30,695

** Out of compliance with November 1973 Report to compliance district-wide mean.

Source: Compiled from November 1973 Compliance Report, January 1974 official school membership lists and January 1974 payroll calculations and benefits included.

Table 6

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP LIST AND RESOURCES REPORT TO THE COURT
LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS

School (Enrollment)	Membership List (M) Filled Positions January 6, 1974			Compliance Report Resources (C) November 28, 1973		
	Teacher	Percent	Salary	Teacher	Percent	Salary
Davis (947)	3rd grade	1.00	$9,982	3rd grade*	$1.00	$14,123
	Reading	.40	6,702			
				Art	.40	4,556
				Language Arts*	.20	2,825
				Reading*	1.00	14,123
				Reading	.60	10,053
				Science	.40	5,125
	TOTAL	1.40	16,684	TOTAL	3.60	50,805
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)	-2.20	-34.121			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY	-1.20	-16,948			
Draper (921)	2nd grade	1.00	9,475	2nd grade	1.00	12,807
	Kindergarten	1.00	10,291	Kindergarten	1.00	12,336
	Foreign Language	.50	6,874	Foreign Language	.25	-3,437
	Latin	1.00	9,506	Latin	.60	5,703
				Language Arts*	1.00	14,123
				Math*	.60	8,474
				Reading*	1.00	14,123
				Science*	1.00	14,123
	TOTAL	3.50	36,146	TOTAL	6.45	85,126
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)	-2.95	-48,980			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY	-3.60	-50,843			

* Vacancy

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 6

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP LIST AND RESOURCES REPORTED TO THE COURT
LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS
(Continued)

School (Enrollment)	Membership List (M) Filled Positions January 6, 1974			Compliance Report Resources (C) November 28, 1973		
	Teacher	Percent	Salary	Teacher	Percent	Salary
Emery (825)	4th grade	1.00	$9,511			
	5th grade	1.00	11,111	1st grade	$1.00	$12,807
	6th grade	1.00	11,111	5th grade	1.00	12,812
	6th grade	1.00	9,511	6th grade*	1.00	14,123
	Art	1.00	9,511	Art*	1.00	14,123
	Latin	.30	3,983	Latin	.25	3,319
				Foreign Language	.35	3.986
	TOTAL	5.30	54,738	TOTAL	4.60	61,170
DIFFERENCE (M-C)		+.70	-6,432			
DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			
Kenilworth (387)	1st grade	1.00	9,511	1st grade	1.00	14,695
	4th grade*	1.00	14,000	4th grade	1.00	18,922
	Language Arts	1.00	16,900	Language Arts	.60	10,139
				4th grade	1.00	13,748
				Art	.50	5,320
				Foreign Language	.37	4,214
				Music	1.00	11,860
	TOTAL	3.00	40,411	TOTAL	5.47	78,898
DIFFERENCE (M-C)		-2.47	-38,487			
DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			

*Vacancy

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 6

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP LISTS AND RESOURCES REPORTED TO THE COURT
LOW SPENDING SCHOOLS
(Continued)

School (Enrollment)		Membership List (M) Filled Positions January 6, 1974			Compliance Report Resources (C) November 28, 1973		
		Teacher	Percent	Salary	Teacher	Percent	Salary
Sandy (413)		1/2nd grade	1.00	$9,511	1st grade	1.00	$14,561
		2nd grade	1.00	10,260	1st grade	1.00	18,922
		K/1st grade	1.00	9,511	1st grade	1.00	15,166
		5th grade	1.00	11,395	1st grade	1.00	13,277
		Art	1.00	11,860	5th grade*	1.00	14,123
		Foreign Language	.80	10,246	Art	.80	9,488
					Foreign Language	.45	5,763
					Math*	1.00	14,123
		TOTAL	5.80	62,783	TOTAL	7.25	105,423
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		-1.45	-42,640			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		-1.00	-14,123			
Sloan (435)		4th grade	1.00	9,511	4th grade*	1.00	14,123
		Foreign Language	.50	5,695	Foreign Language	.55	6,264
		Resource*	1.00	14,000			
					4th grade	1.00	9,885
					4th grade	1.00	12,807
		TOTAL	2.50	29,206	TOTAL	3.55	43,079
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		-1.05	-13,873			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			

Vacancy

APPENDIX II

Table 7

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP LISTS AND RESOURCES REPORTED TO THE COURT
HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS

School (Enrollment)		Membership List (M) Filled Positions January 6, 1974			Compliance Report Resources (C) November 28, 1973		
		Teacher	Percent	Salary	Teacher	Percent	Salary
Nicholas Avenue (683)					Art	.20	$2,372
					Kindergarten*	1.00	14,123
					Kindergarten[1]	1.00	11,860
		Music	.40	3,804	Music*	.40	5,649
					Reading*	.40	5,649
					Math*	.40	5,649
		Physical Ed.	.40	4,104	Physical Ed.	.60	6,156
					Physical Ed.	.40	5,123
		TOTAL	.80	7,908	TOTAL	4.40	56,581
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		-3.60	-48,673			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		-1.80	-25,421			
Peterborough (649)		1st grade	1.00	9,511	Art*	1.00	14,123
		Art	.40	4,934	Art	1.00	12,336
		Music	.40	5,600	Music	.40	6,760
		TOTAL	1.80	20,045	TOTAL	2.40	33,219
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		-.60	-13,174			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			

* Vacancy

1. This person is on the membership list, but paid from Federal funds under the Follow-Through project.

Continued.....

APPENDIX II

Table 7

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP LISTS AND RESOURCES REPORTED TO THE COURT
HIGH SPENDING SCHOOLS
(Continued)

School (Enrollment)		Membership List (M) Filled Positions January 6, 1974			Compliance Report Resources (C) November 28, 1973		
		Teacher	Percent	Salary	Teacher	Percent	Salary
River Terrace (313)		Music	1.00	11,860	Music	.60	7,116
		TOTAL	1.00	11,860	TOTAL	.60	7,116
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		+.40	+4,744			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			
Stevens (210)		-------	0	0	-------	0	0
		TOTAL	0	0	TOTAL	0	0
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		0	0			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			
Stuart (134)					Music	.20	3,688
					Music	.20	3,688
					Physical Ed.	.20	2,052
		TOTAL	0	0	TOTAL	.60	9,428
	DIFFERENCE (M-C)		.60	-9,428			
	DIFFERENCE DUE TO VACANCY		0	0			

*Vacancy

APPENDIX II

Table 8

EXPLANATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Low Spending Schools

School	Enrollment	Difference	Per Pupil Difference	Explanation
Davis	947	$-34121	$-36	The major difficulty appears to be vacancies that go unfilled or are filled for less than the estimated amount. This school has been close to the bottom line in compliance (-4.87%) thus when promised staff does not arrive there is no leeway to maintain compliance.
Draper	921	-48980	$-53	This school was cited again and again in litigation as being underspent. It appears that it is still discriminated against. It, too, was near the bottom line on the compliance report (-4.72%) and therefore, suffered when staff did not arrive. Here again vacancies were a major factor.
Perry	835	- 6432	$- 8	Although the difference is small considering the size of the school population, the difficulty is that the school was near the compliance bottom (-4.51%) and could not afford even minimal shifts due to filling vacancies for less than estimated. In addition, the school increased its enrollment from October to January by 26 pupils thus needing an additional $16,458 for those students.
Kenilworth	587	-38487	$-66	Considerable promised staff did not arrive.
Kitchen	877	-32014	$-37	A person on the compliance report was listed by the principal as a counselor and therefore not eligible to be included in compliance. Again the school was near the bottom line for compliance (-4.37%) and thus fell below when staff did not appear.

APPENDIX II

Table 8

EXPLANATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Low Spending Schools
(Continued)

School	Enrollment	Difference	Per Pupil Difference	Explanation
K[illegible]11	854	-48811	$-57	Assigned staff did not arrive and there was little leeway to absorb the missing staff because the projected expenditure was (-3.87%) from the compliance mean.
N[illegible]s	516	-12641	$-24	Again the difficulty is the closeness of the bottom line to the projected expenditure (-3.82%) thus causing the school to be out of compliance when vacancies are not filled.
O[illegible]	446	-26221	$-59	Vacancies were not filled.
R[illegible]ph	820	-11211	$-14	This school is only three dollars away from compliance, and the failure to fill vacancies pushed the school below the bottom line.
S[illegible]y	833	-42640	$-51	Despite the fact that this school was budgeted slightly above the mean (1.9%), replacement personnel were much less expensive than the expected staff. Vacancies went unfilled so that students were deprived of a $51 per pupil expenditure that had been projected to the court.
S[illegible]n	1035	-13873	$-13	The $13 per pupil expenditure in salaries that never arrived would have put this school right at the bottom line for compliance. Enrollment increased by 30 pupils at a cost of $18,000.

APPENDIX II

Table 8

EXPLANATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
High Spending Schools

School	Enrollment	Difference	Per Pupil Difference	Explanation
Cleveland	252	- 3747	$-15	A slight shift upward in enrollment, coupled with a loss of $15 per pupil expenditures served to put this school that was projected at only slightly below the mean (-1.46%) out of compliance by $3. per pupil.
Harrison	379	-28246	$-75	The assignment of two vacancies in the compliance report put this school, which was already toward the lower limit (-3.12%) beyond the minumum allowable expenditure.
[illegible]	118	-10012	$-85	One person listed on the compliance report also appeared on the membership list; however, she was paid out of Title I funds and so should not be included in the report to the court. With a small school, just a few dollars difference in staff, or downward shift in enrollment, can cause the school to be out of compliance.
Nichols Avenue	333	-48673	$-146	This school is the lowest of all 38 in our sample. It exemplifies all of the problems we have run into. Because of vacancies that weren't filled and staff that never arrived, as well as staff counted in compliance but actually paid for by the federal program Follow-Through, the discrepancy in this school amounted to $146 per pupil. In addition, the school lost 9 children equaling $5,697 at least in equalization benefits. It was also equalized originally below the mean (-2.43%).

APPENDIX II

Table 8

EXPLANATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
High Spending Schools
(Continued)

School	Enrollment	Difference	Per Pupil Difference	Explanation
Pe[illegible]rth	449	-13174	$-29	The increase in enrollment coupled with the fact that the projected equalization was near the lower limit (-4.03%) put this school out of compliance.
River Terrace	313	4744	+15	This school was equalized towards the maximum allowable allocation (4.40%) and the additional staff that was not removed put the school over the amount permissable for equalization.
St[illegible]ns	120	----	+45	This school was equalized at the maximum (5.00%). The enrollment dropped between October and January from 128 to 120. The loss of those 8 children put the school out of compliance.
St[illegible]ert	104	-9428	-91	This school was equalized at the minimum (-4.46%) If the school had received all the services promised, it would still have been well within the compliance range ($631) even though it lost 8 students who are carried on the compliance report. Rather, teachers who appear on the report but have failed to report to the school have put the school out of compliance.

APPENDIX II

Table 9

PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
1971

	Equalization Staff	Support Staff	Special Education Staff	Federally Funded Staff	Total
Low (16674)	$460	$35	$ 7	$14	$516
High (5727)	$687	$67	$21	$21	$796
Percent Difference	49%	91%	200%	50%	54%

Source: Compiled from March 1971 official school membership lists and official March 1971 payroll.

PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES
1974

	Equalization	Support Staff	Special Education	Federal Funds	Total
Low (14610)	$619	$51	$14	$26	$710
High (4951)	$639	$71	$39	$45	$794
Percent Difference	3%	39%	179%	73%	12%

Source: Compiled from January 1974 official school membership lists, October 1973 and January 1974 payrolls. Data includes calculations for benefits.

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A CRITIQUE OF "A QUEST FOR EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN A MAJOR URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICT: THE CASE OF WASHINGTON, D.C."

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July 1975

A CRITIQUE OF "A QUEST FOR EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN A MAJOR URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICT: THE CASE OF WASHINGTON, D.C." 1/

To date the Public School System of the District of Columbia has not conducted a formal, systematic study of the impact on D.C. public education of a 1971 court decree ordering the equalization of expenditures in elementary schools of the District. Therefore, the D.C. school administration welcomed research into the effects of equalizing per pupil expenditures by the Syracuse University Research Corporation, the D.C. Citizens For Better Education, and the Educational Testing Service Education Policy Research Institute.

In anticipation of a scholarly, dispassionate report on the implementation of the Wright Decree and its impact on the school system, the D.C. school administration cooperated fully with the researchers, granting full access to school records, public documents, historical files, and to school personnel.

However, the final report issued in June 1975 by the Educational Policy Research Institute--ETS, A Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity in a Major Urban School District: The Case of Washington, D.C., 2/ fails

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1/ This critique has been coordinated and developed by Joyce Leader, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, Public Schools of the District of Columbia.

2/ Baratz, Joan C., A Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity in a Major Urban School District: The Case of Washington, D.C., Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1975. Referred to in this critique as: the equalization case study, the case study report, or cited as ECS with appropriate page references.

to present constructive, scholarly analysis of the impact of the equalization order. Most of the procedural recommendations made in Chapter VI are already being done by the school system. Those that are not in effect are either irrelevant to the court order or would require an infusion of resources unavailable given current budgetary constraints. The comparison in Chapter V of the allocation of resources prior to the Court Decree in 1971 which the allocation three years later in 1974 bogs down in a discussion of the "disparities" between resource allocation reported to the court in December 1973 and resources actually in the schools in January 1974 with no discussion of the variables that make this so, such as teacher and student mobility. The discussion of alternatives in Chapter VI bogs down with a discussion of whether the school system can be expected to comply with both the equalization decree (that bases expenditure computations on teachers salaries, including benefits) and the U.S. Office of Education Title I Guidelines (that base expenditure computations on teachers salaries, excluding longevity and benefits, and pupil/teacher ratios). The report's conclusion that it is possible for the school system to comply with both formulas is based on hypothetical models so far from sound educational practice and school system policy as to be unrealistic. This tangential section fails to refute the school system's contention that allocation of resources to satisfy both formulas is moot.

To point out factual and interpretive errors that derive from subtle twists of language and statistics, from the use of erroneous and incomplete information, from the omission of relevant information, and from the biased

selection of source materials would require a critique equal in length to the case study. Therefore, this critique will highlight particular problems with the report and offer information to clarify some of the misleading interpretations.

Societal Context

Limited and misused source material for information on the historical situation of Black people in the District of Columbia results in an analysis that "blame the victim" for the injustices of the past and the inequities of the present.

In discussing the Washington, D.C. setting for equalization in Chapter II, the case study conveys an impression that Black administrators in Division II of the school system--the segregated Black division--had independent control over policy-making and fiscal matters, diverted financial resources to the "most promising" students, and rejected "integration" to protect black elitism. To support its contention that "... the black (sic) school division adopted a policy of devoting a large percentage of its meagre resources to those schools it considered were serving the most promising students" (ECS, p.16), the report cites an article about Dunbar High School, an all-Black school until 1955 renowned for its impressive list of well-known graduates. However, the article, "A Case of Black Excellence" by Thomas Sowell (Public Interest Spring 1974), presents information that in fact refutes the claims of the case study. The source cites evidence to show that a majority of Dunbar students, who selected themselves for this non-neighborhood school, were not children of middle-class professionals, were not light-skinned Blacks, and were not above average intellectually. Nor did the school

have an undue share of the educational resources. Writes Sowell: 'Dunbar was of a segregated school system, administered by whites at the top and perennially starved for funds." (Sowell, p. 9).

The case study also claims that historically "... black middle class teachers preferred the "rewards" that came from teaching in schools serving pupils who were more easily motivated to learn" (ECS, p. 17). To support this contention, reference is made to a 1971 Rand Corporation teacher mobility study in San Diego, a setting totally irrelevant to the historical situation in the District and unsupportive of such a claim.

Educational Considerations

The court's 1971 equalization decree permitted the school system to seek--with "adequate justification"--exemption from equalization calculations for schools in two categories:

1. Schools which provided "compensatory education for educationally deprived pupils..." (327 F. Supp. at 864)

2. Schools whose per pupil expenditure varied from the city-wide mean by more than + or - 5% where "that variance... is accounted for solely on the basis of economics or diseconomies of scale..." (327 F. Supp. at 864)

Chapter IV of the case study reports charges that the D.C. School Board disregarded these options and failed to incorporate considerations of educational need in its implementation policy: "The options referred to in the court order ... were not considered. ... The Board did not chose to deal with any such questions regarding educational needs" (ECS, p. 65-66).

Information available to the researchers, but not present in their case study, clearly shows, however, that the Board considered both exemption options in developing its equalization plan and incorporated educational considerations. The first compliance report, submitted by the D.C. School Board to the court October 1, 1971, explains the Board's reasons for seeking no exemptions from equalization for any D.C. school at that time.

Two reasons were offered for seeking no compensatory education exemptions. The terms of the 1967 court decision, binding on the D.C. Public Schools, justified compensatory education "to overcome the detriment of segregation" (269 F. Supp. at 515). The Board decided that, because 95 percent of the pupils in the D.C. schools in 1971 were Black, "almost all schools now would be deserving (of compensatory education)--a circumstance which on the one hand precludes "compensatory" attention as commonly understood, or on the other, forces the development of more specific criteria to isolate schools with the greatest needs." 1/ The Board also noted in its 1971 compliance report, that Federal funds, allocated according to need criteria and not subject to equalization under the 1971 court decree, " are used for contemporary programs based on the needs of children." 2/

On the question of economies of scale -- an argument used by the D.C. school system to explain the high per pupil expenditure of small schools when compared to that of large schools -- the Board noted in

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1/ Compliance Report, September 28, 1971. Public Schools of the District of Columbia. Washington, D.C., 1971, p. 39.

2/ Ibid. p. 39.

the 1971 Compliance Report: "As the Court notes, the amount of variation in teacher costs per pupil explained by economies of scale is unknown and the School Board has chosen to seek at this time no exemptions on grounds of economies of scale." 1/

Neither of these decisions was considered absolute or final. But time was a crucial factor in planning the initial implementation. There were just four months between the May 25, 1971, decree and the October 1 reporting deadline. The court order permits the school system to develop approaches to equalization other than the one specified in the 1971 orders, and currently alternatives are under consideration that would utilize specific criteria to isolate schools with the greatest needs in order to go beyond the dollar-for-dollar equalization currently in effect.

During the initial period of policy development, however, priority focused on minimizing disruption to the educational program, the students, and the teachers who would return to school in September. In accordance with this policy priority, the 1971-1972 school year equalization plan exempted from transfer: 2/

1. Teachers in schools where per pupil expenditure was already within + or - 3% of the city-wide mean (contrary to a statement in the case study report, p.72).

2. Teachers trained with their principals as reading or mathematic mobilization team leaders in accordance with the city-wide Academic Achievement Project.

1/ 1971 Compliance Report, p. 38.

2/ Ibid. p.3.

Special subject teachers, though not exempt, were reassigned manually by subject department heads "because assignment of special subject teachers requires complex educational judgments in the subject areas." 1/ Assignments in these categories were frozen before the computer simulated alternative assignment possibilities for the other elementary classroom teachers.

From among the classroom teachers not frozen into their positions, a list of reassignments was generated by a computer programmed to consider: the staff experience mix at each school, pupil teacher ratios at each school, the percent of the staff that was Black and male at each school, the distribution of teachers at each level (K, 1-3, 4-6) in proportion to the number of students at each level, and the disruption to teachers that might affect their performance. 2/ For the opening of school in September 1971, the first year of equalization, fewer than 300 elementary classroom teachers, about 10 percent, were reassigned. 3/

It is curious that the case study report fails to present information from the 1971 Compliance Report to document its Chapter IV discussion of equalization policy development. In fact, the 1971 Compliance Report to the court is cited just once (ECS, p. 69), a reference to a table showing the distribution of special subject teachers before and after adjustments were made for equalization. Reports submitted to the court in subsequent

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1/ Compliance Report p. 3.

2/ Ibid. p. 50-51; p. 3

3/ Ibid. p. 3.

years are not cited at all. While the chapter does include nine references to School Board meetings held during the summer of 1971 in discussing the management of implementation, heavy reliance is placed on the use of secondary sources: newspapers. Nine statements in the chapter are document with reference to Washington Post articles and editorials; three, to the Washington Star; and one to the Washington Daily News. This reliance on secondary source material in lieu of primary source material raises serious questions about the scholarship of the report, the accuracy of its information base, and the objectivity of its analysis.

Equalization Implementation Procedures

Nowhere in the equalization case study are the on-going administrative procedures for implementing equalization in the District schools explained. The recommendations offered in Chapter VI (ECS, p. 177-180) for assuring future compliance would have the reader believe that provisions for accountability or continuous up-dating of information are currently non-existent.

To the contrary, most of the recommendations offered are already integral parts of the equalization implementation process. Although the court requires schools to be equalized as of December 1 of each school year, implementation is viewed as a continuous process. The main on-going task of the equalization office, staffed by one person, is to maintain accurate up-to-date information on the assignment of the more than 3,000 elementary teachers and aides, the salaries and benefits assigned to these teachers and aides, and the enrollment in each of the elementary schools. This data is collected, corrected, and verified during each spring and fall prior to the reallocation of resources to bring each school into compliance with the court order.

The case study suggests in several recommendations (ECS, p. 179) that the school system should develop the capacity to generate compliance reports monthly to determine which schools are in or out of compliance at any given point in time, with the rational that this will "make the December compliance less disruptive" (ECS, p. 179). The school system totally rejects this suggestion if it is intended to imply that resources should be shifted into or out of a school every time the school slips outside the legal per pupil expenditure corridor. This would involve continual shifting of staff and would prove totally disruptive to the educational process. If on the other hand, it is intended to imply that the school system should monitor compliance with the court order, the school system would agree. However, currently there is no monitoring system distinct from the implementation process of up-dating and verifying computer information files. Funds have never been available for the data collection and on-site validation that would be required for monitoring. In fact, since 1971, budget constraints have forced a reduction from three to one in the number of staff assigned to the Equalization Office.

Analysis of the Impact of Equalization

The methodology used in Chapter V of the case study report to analyze the impact of the equalization decree on the distribution of "measurable educational inputs" raises serious questions concerning the scholarship of the report. Problems include sample selection, misuse of data, and digression to a tangential issue totally outside the specified research framework.

The first part of the impact analysis was to be a comparison of teacher assignment patterns prior to equalization (March 1971) with those of three school years later (1973-1974). The methodology was to focus on "extreme cases," that is, schools with per pupil expenditures farthest from the city-wide mean. But instead of examining teacher assignment patterns in the "high" and "low" schools for both 1971 and 1973-1974, the analysis follows schools designated "high" and "low" on the basis of 1971 data only. Use of this sample permits a change analysis of discrete cases only and precludes generalization to the school system as a whole.

The data, however, on change in these discrete cases is mistakenly treated as group data with implications for the impact of the equalization decree on the total school population. This results in statistical findings that -- despite their apparent significance and favorableness to the school system -- are in fact meaningless.

For example, a comparison is made (ECS, p. 122) based on data in Tables V-9 and V-16 to show that the difference between the mean per pupil expenditure of "high" and "low" spending clusters of schools was reduced from 49% to 3% between 1971 and 1974. This, however, is a meaningless finding. By 1973-1974, the "high" and "low" groups of 1971 no longer clustered at the per pupil expenditure extremes. Instead, by 1973-1974, each group of sample schools contained per pupil expenditure means that spanned the entire range of allowable means. After three years of equalization, the case study's selected sample schools -- labeled "high" and "low" according to 1971 data -- clustered around the city-wide per pupil expenditure mean instead of at the expenditure extremes. No

information is presented about the schools that clustered at the extremes in 1973-1974.

Thus, the analysis that set out to compare teacher assignment patterns by focusing on extreme cases fails to analyze the extreme cases of 1973-1974 and uses meaningless, misleading conceptual labels -- "high" and "low" -- for groupings of selected sample schools. If the researchers wish to depart from the treatment of discrete cases in order to make generalizations about changes in the school system as a whole, then they must reorganize their data and use comparable subsamples.

The case study analysis is further confused by the use of inappropriate data to determine the 1973-1974 status of the selected sample of "high" and "low" schools. The per pupil expenditure means shown in Table V-11 (ECS, p. 120-121) are calculated by the researchers on the basis of January 1974 membership and payroll data. However, the school system currently bases equalization and individual school compliance on membership as of the last Thursday in September and payroll as of October 1. The rationale for using January data, according to the case study report, is that the reallocation of resources authorized in the equalization plan reported to the court in December should be accomplished by January (ECS, p. 121, footnote). This reasoning ignores both the dynamics of the data and the letter of the law.

1. Per pupil expenditure is a fluid statistic. Neither of its components -- staff membership and salary; pupil membership -- is static.

2. Equalization, in accordance with the 1971 court decree, is a point-in-time adjustment of resources. The school system is not held legally liable for maintaining continuous compliance.

Therefore, the use of January data to explain the status of selected schools in 1973-1974, without even a mention of their status as reported to the court in the 1973 Compliance Report, is grossly misleading and dishonest.

Further, even though the case study report uses January 1974 data to calculate the per pupil expendture of its selected sample schools, the December 1973 city-wide mean per pupil expenditure figure is used to determine whether these sample schools were in compliance with the court order (ECS, p. 122). This procedure is just not methodologically possible. If January data is used to calculate per pupil expenditures -- as in the case study report -- then January data, not a December figure based on September and October data, must be used to calculate a comparable point-in-time city-wide per pupil expenditure mean. Only then would there be a common data base for making legitimate determinations of compliance for each school in the sample. As the data has been used, all out-of-compliance determinations noted on Table V-11 (ECS, p. 120-121) are meaningless.

After using erroneously juxtaposed data to determine whether selected sample schools are in compliance, the analysis sinks deeper into a quagmire of data confusion. The study then digresses from an analysis of the changes in resource distribution between 1971 and 1973-1974 to an examination of the so-called "disparities" between the January 1974 resource allocation as calculated by the researchers and the December 1973 resource allocations reported by the school system to the court in December 1973: "While there is considerable agreement between the two

(the November 1973 Compliance Report and the January 1974 membership), it is the differences that are at issue concerning compliance with the court order" (ECS, p. 122). The lengthy digression which follows (ECS, p. 123-152) includes three detailed charts (V-12, V-13 and V-14) and has nothing to do with an analysis of changes in resource allocation between 1971 and 1973-1974. The thrust instead is to build a case -- using phrases such as "the staff allegedly assigned to those schools by the administration" (ECS, p. 123) -- for school system mismanagement and lack of faith in dealing with the court.

The school system, however, denies the report's implied charge of intentional misdirection of resources and lack of good faith in implementing the equalization plan as reported to the court. It also freely admits that resource differences do exist between the plan submitted to the court in December and the per pupil distribution at any given point in time following that submission. A necessary time lag occurs between the computer analysis of up-dated equalization files, the reassignment of resources, and the assumption of new assignments by teachers. This time lag means that if a few families move in or out of a neighborhood (especially where schools are small), or if a teacher resigns, a number of schools could conceivably be out of compliance with the letter of the law by the time new resources reach the school. Despite numerous accountability checks built into the equalization process, "disparities" cannot be avoided. Differences that occur following the December 1 date for reporting to the court are adjusted

the following year. Legally, the school system is not responsible for maintaining continuous compliance which would be, in fact accountability for the mobility of its teachers and pupils.

If any conclusions can be drawn from this methodologically faulty digression based on erroneously juxtaposed data, they are the following:

1. The Equalization Plan submitted to the court in December based on calculations that use September and October data, must be viewed as a model for the per pupil allocation of "measurable educational inputs" during the remainder of the school year.

2. Teacher and student mobility seriously affect the stability and enduring accuracy of per pupil expenditure calculations.

3. Anything other than the current point-in-time equalization reporting system would result in continual shifting of teacher resources, a situation considered disruptive enough when it occurs once a year.

Equalization and Compliance with Title I Guidelines

The school system maintains that the 1971 equalization decree and the Office of Education Title I Guidelines are incompatible and cannot both be accomplished within the framework of sound educational policy. The case study report attempts to demonstrate in Chapter VI the compatibility of these conflicting formulas, but instead proves that the internal logic of the formulas requires educationally unsound policy if both the court and the Office of Education are to be satisfied.

The case study analysis bases its conclusions on model situations so atypical that they lack heuristic value. The "extreme cases" used

in Examples I, II, and III (FCS, p. 186-189) are two schools, A and B, each with 500 pupils. But School A has twice as many teachers as School, B and School A has all inexperienced teachers, while School B has all experienced teachers. The pupil/teacher ratio at School B (31.2:1) exceeds the School Board policy limit. Neither has any special subject teachers, and both are equalized at about 3.8 per cent below the city-wide mean of $666.45, the compliance standard in December 1973.

Examples II and III demonstrate the absurdity of such a model. To make School B comparable under the Title I formula, which excludes the longevity pay of its all-experienced staff, 9.8 support staff must be added to bring the mean as calculated by the Title I guidelines above the $513 lower limit and to bring the pupil/staff ratio down to 18/1. However, there is no guarantee that this school of 500 students needs a librarian, psychologist, speech teacher, counselor, etc., the only type of staff that could be added without throwing the school out-of-compliance with equalization. In addition, no school with fewer than 600 pupils is entitled, under School Board rules, to an Assistant Principal, as is added to School B in Example III. The report gives no indication as to the source of these support staff or their salaries. Any addition of support staff at one school means the deletion of such services at another, a complexity the school system must face that is totally absent in the two-school examples used for analysis in the case study. Further, although the pupil/staff ratio is lowered at School B, the pupil/classroom teacher ratio remains unchanged, i.e. above the Board limit. This proposed "solution" for making the schools both "equal" and "comparable" thus has no educational rationale, a criteria

emphasized as non-negotiable throughout the case study report and considered non-negotiable by the school system.

Example IV, Steps 1, 2, and 3 (ECS, p. 190-192) alters the assumed characteristics of Schools A and B by mixing the experience levels at each school, a situation which, as the case study report indicates, is "more representative" of the true situation "since the District has attempted to mix teacher experience levels in the schools" (ECS, p. 193). To achieve comparability however, each school requires 2.8 additional support staff. Again, there is no indication of the source of these personnel or their funding and no educational rationale for their addition is evident.

Examples V, VI, and VII (ECS, p. 193-195) attempt to show that even schools equalized at the extremes, but within the 5 percent corridor above and below the city-wide mean, can be made comparable. School A with an equalization mean of $616 is assumed to be at the minus 5% level. In fact, because the lower limit for equalization was $632.18 in 1973-1974, the school in the example is not in compliance at all. Its mean of $616 is actually 7.4 percent below the city-wide mean of $665.45. (Throughout the discussion of these examples, it should be noted that the case study report fails to clarify exactly what the city-wide mean for equalization and its $\pm$5 percent corridor was for the year in question). Also, the "solution" again requires the addition of support staff, for whom there may be no educational rationale and of which there is no unlimited supply.

The case study report claims that "comparability does not give Title I schools the option that Judge Wright alluded to, which is to employ more teachers because one employs inexperienced teachers" (ECS, p. 195). To the contrary, if the examples given in the report show anything, they show that the best way to ensure that a Title I school will be both "equal" and "comparable" is to equalize it with the largest number of the lowest paid teachers. This will keep the school's salary component high when longevity is excluded, keep its pupil/staff ratio low, and thus require the minimum of staff reassignment. This logic suggests restrictions on staff assignment and local school decision-making that defy consideration of educational need and sound educational policy.

The case study report states that "inequity in the distribution of funds and services can be masked when individual schools are compared with a group mean" (ECS, p. 195), as in the case in the Title I comparability formula. In context, this statement is used to support the report's contention that the comparability formula -- which lacks an upper limit -- cannot replace the equalization formula in ensuring an equitable distribution of resources. However, the implication that a closer examination of non-Title I schools and their relationship to the non-Title I per pupil expenditure mean could reveal previously "masked" inequities seems worth persuing. A ranking of all non-Title I schools according to their mean per pupil expenditure where longevity is excluded might reveal just where the high salaried, experienced teachers are actually teaching. Similarly, a ranking according to pupil/staff ratios might reveal specific groups of schools either at the top end or the bottom end of the scale.

Cost of Equalization

An analysis of the impact of equalization on the school system is incomplete without some consideration being given to the costs involved. This is not to suggest that there could be some trade-off between the benefit derived by pupils from equalized access to educational inputs and the costs to the system of reallocating resources. But the cost of the current method of equalization should be a factor in evaluating it against recommended modifications or alternative procedures. No consideration of cost is included in the case study report.

Determining the cost is not an easy task. If central office and field staff time is to be used as a measure of cost, time-consuming data collection must be undertaken. The school system has not, to date, kept a record of such costs for equalization alone; the line-item rather than program budget of the school system makes such record-keeping a tedious process. Some rough and partial estimates, however, can suggest the magnitude of such costs.

To assist the school system in setting up the initial implementation procedures between the June and October, 1971, contracts were awarded totaling $94,753.71. During the first year of implementation, several top school officials devoted a considerable portion of their time to implementation:[1/]

1/ Estimates from the school system's current equalization officer, Betty Holton, who has worked with equalization since the 1971 decree.

Staff	Estimated Time
July 1971 - October 1971 (4 months)	
Vice-Superintendent	40%
Exec. Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	60%
Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	100%
Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	100%
Admin. Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	20%
Clerk-Typists	170%
November 1971 - June 1972 (8months)	
Vice-Superintendent	10%
Exec. Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	20%
Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	70%
Asst. to the Vice-Superintendent	70%

Since July 1972 the Equalization Office has been cut back to one person who works almost full-time on implementation. Occasionally, just prior to the presentation of the equalization plan to the court, additional staff have been detailed to assist in that office. A total costing of equalization according to staff time estimates would include the time spent by personnel in the school system's computer center, the cost of supplies, the cost of computer runs, and the cost of time spent by the Corporation Counsel, Board members and all the persons in the schools who collected or verified data for computerized information files.

If the costs are to be measured in terms of disruption to the teachers, pupils, and educational program, then another type of data collection and investigation needs to be undertaken. None of these aspects of the impact of equalization on the school system have been touched on in the case study report.

Benefits of Equalization

Not all of the results of equalization would be classified as costs. The equalization process has produced some valuable side effects

that have contributed to reducing the inequities of practices inherited from the once segregated, dual school system. Previously informal procedures have become formalized; previously vague policies have been clarified or defined. For example, although "equal access" was defined by the court in terms of the allocation of regular operating budget funds, the equalization process has had a positive effect on the reallocation of capital funds as well. The entire construction program was examined and overhauled in an effort to reduce the overcrowding in the under-funded Anacostia region. The equalization process also had an impact on the procedures used for determining the allocation of Title I funds prior to the current comparability guidelines. Procedures for allocating money for textbooks and supplies, expenditures not regulated by the court decree, were revised along per pupil expenditure lines. The case study report makes no reference to school system operating procedures affected positively by the equalization decree.

Fundamental Questions

The prospect of other school jurisdictions adapting Judge Wright's 1971 Equalization Decree as a model for adjusting resource allocation inequities makes it imperative for some fundamental questions to be raised on the basis of the D.C. experience. The case study report, however, fails to raise such questions. Instead the report approaches the case study analysis with unchallenging acceptance of the logic of the court decree. By doing so, the report implies that justice derives compliance.

Judge Skelly Wright's decision in Hobson v. Hansen (1971) is one of a number of court decisions that attempts to add substance to the legal definition of "equal educational opportunity." It contributed the concept that equal educational opportunity consists of equal access to objectively measurable educational inputs. The court interpreted this concept in terms of expenditure per pupil for teachers and reasoned that equal opportunity could best be achieved by equalized expenditure. The court-order remedy to redress the imbalance found in the allocation of D.C. teacher resources required that the mean per pupil expenditure for each school not vary by more than ±5% from the city-wide mean per pupil expenditure. The intent of the equalization decree was to force a reallocation of resources that would distribute "quality teachers" -- defined as the most expensive teachers according to their salary level -- more equitably throughout the school system.[1/]

Two questions that should be raised, which are not touched on in the case study report, are:

1. Are "quality" teachers best identified by the length of their teaching service as indicated by their salary level (including longevity increments and benefits)?

2. Does equal expenditure on pupils mean they have equal access to educational opportunity?

In arguing its case in 1967 and 1971, the D.C. School System maintained that teachers' salary scales are based on experience, not performance, and that research has not shown experience to have a significant correlation with performance as measured by student achievement. In both its 1967

[1/] Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 864 (1971).

and 1971 decisions the court rejected this argument on grounds that D.C.'s teacher recruitment efforts to attract and hold experienced teachers by offering them attractively high salaries were a "testimonial" to the fact that experience is a "real asset for a teacher" (269 F. Supp. at 434).

Does the evidence of equalization bear this out? Are students in schools that received high paid teachers as a result of equalization demonstrating greater mastery of reading and mathematic skills? The case study report does not explore this. It touches on the issue of the impact of equalization on academic performance (ECS, p. 163-164), but its finding that some schools in the "high" group and some in the "low" moved up or down a quintile at the end of three years of equalization is meaningless. It does not relate that movement to the school's expenditure level or its staffing pattern. Some form of analysis that relates teacher experience to student skill mastery over the time period of equalization would be useful in either accepting or rejecting the court's definition of "quality" teachers.

Underlying the 1971 equalization decree is the assumption that all students have an equal chance to be successful in the academic system if equal amounts of money are spent on them. This assumes that children are more similar in their educational needs than they are different. Perhaps what is needed--once a school system can demonstrate that a pattern of discrimination no longer exists in its resource allocation--is an approach that assumes children are more different than they are alike, that variation in expenditure and educational program is more appropriate than is the equalization of expenditure.

In developing an alternative to equalization to present to the court, the D.C. School System is moving the direction of a plan based on assumptions of dissimilar student need. A January 1975 paper submitted to the Board of Education by School Superintendent Barbara A. Sizemore, entitled "Becoming 'Comparable' and 'Equal': Questions and Answers," stated the following philosophical approach:

> "...'equal' is defined in terms of equity or the meeting of the educational needs of all children with justice, fairness, and impartiality...the needs of children vary, and...since these needs vary educational programs must vary. Some educational programs cost more than others. Therefore, providing each student with educational programs that cost equal dollar amounts reduces the extent to which appropriate educational programs can be provided for all children and hence erodes the pursuit of equity. What is needed, then, is an educational system for people, all of whom are different, instead of one for people who are assumed to be alike. This will require a model in which resources are commensurate with need...Programs that cost approximately equal dollars cannot meet greatly varying educational needs." (Sizemore, p. 7, 8)

The question then raised in the paper is whether "the arbitrary plus or minus 5% mechanical constraint embedded in the existing (equalization) decree" permits a variation of resources that is compatible with the variation of student need. Data to support or reject such a proposition has not been collected for analysis.

Conclusion

Each time the school system goes through the process of implementing the 1971 Equalization Decree, modifications are made in implementation procedures and in the methods that are used to effect equalization.

Some departures from the initial 1971 equalization plan, such as the change in the data base from projected enrollment to actual enrollment figures, have made implementation of the order more realistic. Others, such as the practice of achieving compliance with the letter of the law by shifting special subject teachers instead of classroom teachers raises questions about compliance with the spirit of the law.

A scholarly case study analysis of the impact of equalization on the Public Schools of the District of Columbia could be a useful document for school system administrators and educational planners both in the District and elsewhere. However, for the reasons cited in this critique, the document, A Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity in a Major Urban School District: The Case of Washington, D.C. prepared for the National Institute of Education by the Syracuse University Research Corporation, the D.C. Citizens for Better Education, and the ETS Education Policy Research Institute fails to achieve constructive analysis of a controversial experiment of interest to the entire educational community.

Postscript

The D.C. Citizens for Better Public Education prepared a summary of A Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity in a Major Urban School District: The Case of Washington, D.C. Although the structure and format of the summary bear little resemblence to the original report, the substance is unchanged. In a constructive omission, the summary makes no reference to the report's discussion of the Washington, D.C., "societal context" nor to the report's digression into the compatibility

of the equalization decree and the Title I comparability guidelines. But in all other respects the summary includes all the errors in methodology, data utilization, data analysis, data interpretation, and data presentation contained in the original report. Therefore, the summary is subject to the same criticisms that apply to the total report.

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